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Trickle-Down Ethnic Politics: Drunk and Absent in the 
Kenya Police Force (1957–1970)†
By Oliver Vanden Eynde, Patrick M. Kuhn, and Alexander Moradi*
How does ethnic politics affect the state’s ability to provide  policing 
services? Using a panel of administrative personnel data on the 
full careers of 6,784 police officers, we show how the rise of  ethnic 
 politics around Kenya’s independence influenced  policemen’s 
 behavior. We  find a significant deterioration in discipline after 
Kenya’s first multiparty election for those police officers of ethnic 
groups  associated with the ruling party. These effects are driven by 
a behavioral change among these policemen. We find no evidence of 
favoritism within the police. Instead, our results are consistent with 
co-ethnic officers experiencing an emboldenment effect. Our  findings 
highlight that the state’s security apparatus, at its most granular 
level, is not insulated from ethnic politics. (JEL D72, J15, K42, O15, 
O17)
The efficient provision of public goods relies on a well-functioning  public  service, yet many developing countries lack an efficient public sector. 
For instance, many authors documented widespread absenteeism in the health and 
education  sectors (World Bank 2004; Banerjee and Duflo 2006; Duflo, Hanna, and 
Ryan 2012; and Callen et al. 2016), despite the fact that public sector positions are 
often  well paid and highly prized.1 Finan, Olken, and Pande (2017) emphasizes 
three aspects that are key to understanding the behavior of public servants: selection, 
1 Finan, Olken, and Pande (2017) estimates that public sector workers in Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, and 
Tanzania earn more than double the average wage in the private sector. Even when taking into account  differences 
in occupational structures of the two sectors, a premium of about 20 percent remains. 
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incentive  structures, and monitoring. Our paper highlights a fourth factor: political 
 institutions, which can encroach on the  day-to-day behavior of public servants.
In this paper, we use original data obtained from administrative personnel 
records that allow us to track 6,784 Kenyan police officers over their entire career. 
These records track the offenses committed by each police officer on duty,  including 
incidents of absenteeism, untidiness, drunkenness, disobedience, and violence.2 
We use these data to study the period 1957–1970 and investigate how the rise of 
ethnic politics affected the performance of policemen. Our results show that quickly 
following the first multiparty elections in 1961 and rising ethnic politics in Kenya, 
police officers from ethnic groups that were part of the dominant Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) party started to behave significantly worse.
Figure  1 visualizes this striking pattern by comparing offense probabilities 
for policemen whose ethnicities were represented in the dominant KANU party 
with  those of ethnic groups in opposition and out of power. In the analysis that 
 follows, we investigate the channels that underlie this pattern, scrutinizing the 
aspects that the literature put forward as key channels (selection, incentive  structures, 
and monitoring).
2 Administrative data collected by bureaucracies themselves are rarely used in empirical work (Pepinsky, 
Pierskalla, and Sacks 2017). 
Figure 1. Misconduct by Ethnic Groups Associated with the Ruling Party (KANU)
Notes: This figure plots the offense rate of police officers in a given year, split by whether 
the ethnic group of the police officer was affiliated with the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU), i.e., the Gema (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru) alliance throughout, the Luo until 1965, and 
the Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu) after 1964. The year 1961 marks 
Kenya’s first multiparty election.
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We establish three key results. First, the increase in misconduct is driven by a 
change in behavior from policemen rather than personnel selection. We also find 
no evidence that changes in work assignments to particular police divisions might 
have caused these increases. Second, the effect is strongest for objective offenses, 
such as absenteeism and drunkenness, but weak for more subjective offenses, 
such as  disobedience. This fact suggests that the change in offense rates does not 
merely reflect discriminatory reporting. The context in which the original data were 
 generated, as well as the evidence on potential mechanisms, are inconsistent with 
systematic misreporting. Third, we test whether favoritism distorted incentives. 
We  confirm that policemen with a history of misconduct were less likely to be 
 promoted and more likely to be dismissed. However, KANU policemen were not 
treated differently in this respect. Therefore, the deterioration of behavior is not a 
response to changing incentives within the police. Moreover, there is no  evidence 
that KANU policemen are more willing to resign voluntarily, which suggests 
that improved outside options are unlikely to drive their behavior. However, one 
 explanation consistent with our results is that ethnic politics created a general sense 
of empowerment, which emboldened the policemen of the ruling ethnic groups. 
Our results show that civil servants are not insulated from shocks to the political 
salience of their identities.
Our paper adds to three important strands of literature. First, we contribute to a 
fast-expanding research area that Finan, Olken, and Pande (2017) describes as the 
“personnel economics of the state.”3 Understanding the determinants of  public  sector 
performance is central to this literature. Existing work on high-level  bureaucrats 
has emphasized the role of training and career background (Bertrand et al. 2015), 
 personality traits (Callen et al. 2015), and patronage networks  involving  politicians 
(Iyer and Mani 2012; Lehne, Shapiro, and Vanden Eynde 2018; Nath 2016; and 
Xu  forthcoming). Dal BÓ, Finan, and Rossi (2012) studies how advertised work 
 conditions for  bureaucratic posts affect the pool of applicants. However, the 
 literature has paid  little attention to how ethnic politics shapes the behavior of 
public servants. Moreover, researchers rarely have access to complete personnel 
records of “ street-level  bureaucrats”—using the terminology of Lipsky (1969)—
like  policemen.4 Relying on detailed historical data, our paper shows that political 
shocks can affect the  day-to-day job performance of the state’s rank-and-file.
Second, our work contributes to our understanding of the determinants of police 
behavior. Compared to other public sectors, there is also a dearth of work on police 
performance, especially in low income countries.5 Nevertheless, protecting  citizens 
3 The police is more complex than other public services. Financially incentivizing easily observable tasks (e.g., 
arrests made, fines issued) may lead to overzealous and inaccurate enforcement and crowd out other important 
but non-incentivized tasks. Moreover, in contrast to the health and education sectors that are characterized by a 
common interest of the state and its citizens—both want public servants (teachers, doctors, nurses) to provide high 
quality services—there is a tension between the interest of the government and the citizens at the receiving end of 
the police work (the alleged criminals). Recent innovations rest on such common interest by enlisting the help of 
citizens (Banerjee and Duflo 2006, Reinikka and Svensson 2005). 
4 Neggers (2017) provides evidence of own-group favoritism of polling officers influencing election results 
in India. 
5 One paper, not set in a developing country context but relevant for our suggested behavioral mechanism, 
is Mas (2006). He finds that pay raises below a reference point reduce job performance in the New Jersey Police. 
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and their property is one of the most fundamental public goods that the state  provides, 
and one that is ripe for abuse under the wrong conditions (Auerbach 2003, World Bank 
2000). One notable exception is Banerjee et al. (2012), who uses an RCT to study the 
effects of work conditions and monitoring of policemen in Rajasthan. They find that 
better training and decoy visits improved police  effectiveness and its public image. 
Sierra and Titecay (2016) sheds light on illicit  rent-sharing agreements between 
lower and senior ranks of the traffic police in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Sharing our focus on ethnic politics in Kenya, Hassan (2017) provides evidence 
on how political interference perverted the purpose of the police. She finds that 
 co-ethnic police officers were strategically placed to swing constituencies in the 
1992 and 1997 Kenyan elections. Our paper shows that ethnic politics has impacts 
that are not limited to the policing of elections. Even without the direct interference 
of politicians, ethnic affinities can undermine the effectiveness and discipline of 
police officers.
Third, this paper adds to our understanding of the economic costs of ethnic 
 diversity. Several studies link ethnic diversity to poor economic growth at the macro 
level (Easterly and Levine 1997; De Luca et al. 2015; Desmet,  Ortuño-Ortín, and 
Wacziarg 2012; and Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou 2016). At the local 
level, ethnic diversity is typically associated with poor public goods provision 
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2007). For Kenya, Miguel 
and Gugerty (2005) shows that ethnic diversity is associated with worse schooling 
 facilities and access to water. Burgess et al. (2015) shows how Kenyan road  building 
was  concentrated in the districts that share the same ethnicity as the president in 
power—an effect that disappears during democratic times. Similarly, Kramon and 
Posner (2016) finds positive impacts on education levels for the co-ethnics of the 
minister of education, even in periods of multiparty elections.6 Our paper  provides 
micro-evidence on how the rise of ethnic politics disrupts the  functioning of the 
state’s bureaucracy by affecting the performance of its personnel.7 A small  number 
of recent papers uses similarly fine grained outcomes. For example, Shayo and 
Zussman (2011, 2017) shows that exposure to ethnic conflict increases in-group 
bias among Israeli judges. Rasul and Rogger (2015) finds that ethnic diversity 
makes Nigerian bureaucrats more productive. Focusing on team performance in the 
context of Kenyan flower farms, Hjort (2014) shows how ethnic tensions reduce 
 productivity in ethnically  heterogeneous production teams. In contrast, we find 
that it is not  ethnic diversity in itself, but the political dominance of certain ethnic 
groups that drives poor performance. This result could reflect that both the nature 
of  political shocks (violent ethnic conflict versus increased political power) and the 
nature of the organization (private firms producing in teams versus public service) 
matter for the relationship between ethnic politics and job performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
background information on ethnic politics and the police in Kenya. Sections II and III 
6 Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015) qualifies these findings by showing that allocation of minister posts in 
African governments tends to reflect the population share of ethnic groups. 
7 Our paper takes differences between ethnic groups or alliances as given. Posner (2004) studies the  conditions 
under which ethnic cleavages become salient by comparing the same ethnic groups in the different political 
 environments of Zambia and Malawi. 
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describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section IV presents the results. Section V 
studies potential mechanisms, followed by a discussion in Section VI. Section VII 
briefly discusses external validity. Section VIII concludes.
I. Background
A. The Rise of Ethnic Politics
Kenya is a multi-ethnic state, made up of more than 40 ethnic groups. Prior to 
British colonial rule, boundaries between the groups were fluid (Parsons 2012); 
 centralized political structures were absent, and authority was located at the village 
level and typically personal, often a function of lineage, age, and wealth rather than 
ethnic allegiance (Mamdani 1996, Herbst 2000, and Lynch 2011).
The roots of ethnic politics lie in the colonial era. The uneven penetration of 
European settlers created stark economic differences between ethnic groups 
(Ajulu  2002, Omolo  2002). At the same time, the colonial administration 
 discouraged the  formation of  nationwide African political activity. Consequentially, 
ethnic, or at best provincial, political bodies were created (e.g., the Kikuyu 
Provincial Association), which contributed to the differentiation of ethnicities with 
 distinct  political interests (Sanger and Nottingham 1964, Omolo 2002). By 1957, 
the   following politically relevant ethnic divisions had emerged: the Kikuyu 
(19.7  percent), which together with the Meru (5.3 percent) and Embu (1.2  percent) 
form the ethnic coalition called Gema; the Kalenjin (10.8 percent), which together 
with the Maasai (1.9  percent), Turkana (2.2 percent), and Samburu (0.6 percent) form 
the ethnic coalition Kamatusa; the Luo (13.8 percent); the Luhya (13.1   percent); 
and the Kamba (11.2 percent) (Morgan 2000, Posner 2004).
After the defeat of the (Kikuyu-led) Mau Mau uprising in 1956,  restrictions on 
political activity were relaxed. In the run-up to the first (although under severely 
 limited franchise) African elections to the legislative council in 1957, the  government 
allowed the formation of district associations, further nourishing  tribalism and 
giving birth to majimboism (i.e., regionalism) (Sanger and Nottingham  1964, 
Anderson  2005). The 1960s marked Kenya’s transition toward independence on 
December  12, 1963. The years 1960–1961 were characterized by the  electoral 
 run-up to the first open,  nationwide,  multiparty election that would determine the 
 transition government and the constitution. African political parties were fully 
 sanctioned at the Lancaster House Conference in January  1960. In May  1960, 
the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed from existing tribal and 
 provincial organizations. KANU, headed by Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), became 
an intensely anti-colonial and  nationalist party but drew most of its leadership, 
 membership, and support from the Gema coalition and the Luo. Fearing Kikuyu and 
Luo dominance, minority ethnic groups (the Kamatusa and coastal groups) formed 
the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) (Ndegwa 1997). Led by Ronald 
Ngala (a Mijikenda), KADU advocated majimboism, which would give  significant 
powers to the regions (Ajulu 2002, Anderson 2005). Ethnic rhetoric and  antagonism 
ran high in the  campaign, resulting in ethnic clashes and displacements in Rift Valley 
Province (Ajulu 2002). The 1961 election, which KANU won with 67 percent of 
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the votes over KADU’s 16 percent, clearly illustrated the parties’ relative strength 
and established Kenyatta as the dominant postindependence  figure (Bennett and 
Rosberg 1961, Hartmann 1999). As Manners (1962) commented, there was “little 
 reason to believe the next vote will be very different.” Indeed, when the two parties 
contested the “ independence election” in 1963, KANU won overwhelmingly taking 
83 seats against KADU’s 33 in the lower house and 18 seats against KADU’s 16 
in the Senate (Throup 1993, Hartmann 1999). Kenyatta became prime minister and 
later president. In 1964, KADU and KANU merged (Ndegwa 1997). As a result, 
Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin and the vice president in KADU at the time, became 
Home Minister and directly responsible for the police.8
The fusion of KANU and KADU shifted the balance of power in favor of the 
 conservative elements within KANU, which led to the defection of the  left-leaning 
wing led by Odinga (a Luo) in 1965, creating a new opposition party, the Kenya 
People’s Union (KPU). It opposed the perceived growing conservatism and 
 pro-Western orientation of the KANU leadership, which by then was composed 
exclusively of members of the Gema and Kamatusa (Ajulu 2002). In the  subsequent 
series of by-elections held in 1966, KANU further expanded its majority in 
both houses of parliament. Following the anti-communist logic of the Cold War, 
the KPU was banned on national security grounds in 1969, ushering in a more than 
20-year period of single party rule. Our study covers the last years of colonial rule 
 (1957–1963) and the first years of independence (1963–1970). Figure 2 summarizes 
the key  political events that mark the inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups to 
power. These are the political events we exploit to estimate the impact of ethnic 
politics on police performance.
B. Police Organization and Development
The Kenya Police is Kenya’s main law enforcing body. It has always been an 
instrument of regime protection. During colonial times, the police answered only to 
the governor. At independence, this unchecked concentration of power passed to the 
president (Auerbach 2003). The police is therefore vulnerable to political influence, 
which may ultimately affect the performance of its personnel.
During colonial times, British officers hoped to find men of soldierly qualities 
and whose loyalty could be trusted among the Kamba and Kalenjin (the so-called 
“ martial races”). In contrast, very few Kikuyus entered the police force.9 Only after 
the end of Mau Mau (in 1956) and in anticipation of Kenya’s independence, 
a   deliberate attempt was made to bring the ethnic composition in line with that 
of the population (Clayton 1989). Around 1960, Police Commissioner Richard 
Catling  initiated a process of Africanization in the higher ranks (Throup 1992). 
8 The president and the Home Minister were the two positions in control of the police. Hence, from 1964 onward, 
control of the police was in the hands of the Gema-Kamatusa alliance that dominated KANU. Other  ministerial 
 portfolios, however, were more broadly shared among ethnic groups at that time (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015). 
9 In 1956, 22.6 percent, 21.6 percent, and 3.2 percent of police officers were Kalenjin, Kamba, and Kikuyus, 
whereas the 1962 census population put their share at 10.8 percent, 10.5 percent, and 18.8 percent, respectively 
(Kenya Police Annual Reports, Census 1962). 
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Hastily  trained,  newly-promoted African officers gradually replaced Asian and 
European senior officers.
After Kenyatta took control in 1963, as prime minister and then president, 
changes in the police followed the same pattern as in the most important  ministries 
(Hornsby  2012). Kenyatta relied on ethnic loyalties and alliances. He appointed 
Bernard Hinga, an ethnic Kikuyu, as police commissioner in 1964, and by 1967 all 
but one of its branches and departments were led by an ethnic Kikuyu. Kenyatta 
particularly relied on the General Service Unit (GSU). The GSU is a paramilitary 
branch of the police, well equipped and well trained, and highly political. It was 
employed against internal political threats, and specifically formed a  counterweight 
to the army. Kenyatta shifted the GSU’s officer corps in favor of the Kikuyu, 
 especially Luo officers had to go.
The geographical organization followed a fourfold hierarchy with the 
 headquarters in Nairobi, then police divisions, stations, and finally, police posts that 
could be as small as a road block. The Kenya Police were not evenly or equally 
 distributed. Reflecting longstanding colonial interests, the police were heavily 
 concentrated in the urban commercial and European residential areas. They also 
served the “White Highlands,” where Europeans owned farms. In 1957, as a leg-
acy of Mau Mau, the police were also well presented in Kikuyu and the bordering 
Kalenjin areas (Throup 1992). With the end of violence, however, the number of 
police posts were reduced in those areas. The majority of African rural areas, in 
contrast, were  underserved.10 After independence, the policing network expanded, 
particularly to African areas.
10 African reserves were originally policed by the “Administration Police,” which dealt with offenses against 
district council by-laws and customary law. The Kenya Police dealt with offenses against the penal code and  general 
legislation (TNA CO1037/41). 
Figure 2. Timeline of Events around Kenya’s Independence
Note: The figure highlights the key political events that mark the changes in the ethnic power coalition of KANU.
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II. Data and Measurements
A. Collection and Sampling
Our primary data sources are the Kenya Police Service Registers. These  service 
records contain systematic and comprehensive information about a police  officer 
over the full length of his career. In particular, the service registers recorded  personal 
details at recruitment (name, ethnicity, height, place of birth, and  residence), 
any  training beyond the obligatory six months, names of divisions at which the 
police officer served with dates of transfers, any misconducts/commendations and 
corresponding punishments/rewards, promotions/demotions, and particulars of 
 discharge (date, reason, overall conduct).
These personnel files are from non-active police officers and were sorted out 
for destruction in 2009. Awaiting appraisal by the Kenya National Archives, the 
files were dumped in a depot at the outskirts of Nairobi. The files did not follow 
any  obvious order and leaks in the roof destroyed a good share of the records. 
Our  sampling  strategy was to collect all readable registers of African police  officers, 
with the exception of police officers of Kamba ethnic origin recruited before 1950, 
whom we deliberately undersampled as they were numerous in the police force 
before  1950.11 We checked whether the ethnic composition, the organizational 
structure (units, provinces), and the prevalence of dismissals in our sample follow 
the official statistics reported in the Kenya Police Annual Reports and the Statistical 
Abstracts. With the exception of the Kamba before 1950, there is a very strong 
agreement between the sources.12 We are therefore confident that our sample is 
largely representative of the Kenya Police Force, especially for the time period we 
focus on. The attained sampling rate is about 1:4 throughout the 1957–1970 period 
(see online Appendix Figures A1 and A3).13
For our purposes, we bring the data into a police officer-service year panel 
 structure. Our panel has 6,784 policemen doing their service between 1957 
and  1970.14 We choose 1957 as the starting point of our conduct sample, as it is 
the first year after the end of the Mau Mau uprising.15 This sample still includes 
four years of data before the 1961 elections that made the KANU party Kenya’s 
dominant political force. Our sample stops in 1970, as we do not have any records 
of policemen  entering service after this year.
11 It was easy to identify the year of recruitment as the color of the service registers turned from blue to red in 
the 1950s. 
12 Online Appendix Figures A2, A3, and A4 show these comparisons. The Kamba undersampling is visible in 
Figure A2, while different reporting of “others” is probably due to differences in categorization of smaller groups. 
The administrative data on the ethnic composition ends in 1962. 
13 Weighting Kamba officers in our sample to correct for undersampling does not change our main result; see 
online Appendix Table B7. 
14 Policemen enter our sample after the typical training period of six months, or their “promotion” from recruit 
to constable—whichever occurred earlier. 
15 We do not include the period of the Mau Mau rebellion in the main analysis, because we do not think that it 
is a valid baseline to compare the rise of ethnic politics to. Policing tasks were very different in nature, in particular 
in regions affected by the conflict (Throup 1992). 
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B. Measurement
For each police officer, we know the dates of entry and exit, family  background, 
ethnic group,16 education, place of birth, a full promotion record, assignment 
 history, acts of misconduct, punishment for misconduct, good behavior,  training 
 undertaken, rewards for good performance, and the character assessment on 
 discharge. Among these variables, the richest information is contained in the  conduct 
and punishment variables.17 These cover an extremely wide range of  misbehavior 
by  policemen, and are recorded at relatively high frequency and great  detail. 
We  observe 11,406 offenses in our sample of 44,689 officer-years. One   officer, 
for example, is reported to have stolen a “leopard’s skin.” We assign these acts of 
 misconduct to a limited number of categories. The most common offenses are  failure 
to attend duty and absence without leave (36 percent), drunkenness (10  percent), 
being dirty (8 percent), disobedience (8 percent), falling asleep on duty (4 percent), 
and  allowing prisoners to escape (3  percent). Sixty-three  percent of  policemen 
 commit at least one offense. In the main specifications, we rely on a binary offense 
 variable,  indicating whether an individual has committed any offenses in a given 
year. This annual offense  probability is around 20 percent.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables. About 17 percent of officers 
were stationed in regions where their own ethnicity is the largest group (i.e., their 
ethnic homelands). About 33 percent of policemen signed their booklet, whereas 
the remaining officers provided just a thumbprint. Formal education is limited, with 
only about 30 percent having any formal education. The rank of every  policeman 
is  summarized on a zero to three scale, where zero corresponds to constables and 
recruits; one to corporals; two to sergeants; and three to inspectors and above. 
The  average rank is close to zero. The service registers also provide a character 
assessment at discharge, ranging from “Bad” to “Exemplary,” which we code on a 
scale between zero and four, where the sample mean is around two.
Acts of misconduct can be fined, and conditional on committing an offense, the 
average fine in our sample is about 16 Kenyan shilling. Fines are by far the most 
common form of punishment, and imposed in 77 percent of offenses. In another 
10  percent of cases, the offense is punished in another way, for example with 
drills, hard labor, suspension, or in extreme cases detention. Not included in this 
16 We code and standardize ethnic groups as follows. We combine Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru into “Gema.” 
We defined the Kalenjin (any of the subgroups of Cherangani, Keiyo, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Ndorobo, Pokot, 
Sabaot, Tugen), Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu as “Kamatusa.” We then have the Kamba, Kisii, Kuria, Abaluhya, 
Luo, Mijikenda, and Somali as relevant players. We grouped all other ethnic groups into one residual category. 
17 Rules and procedures are laid down in Ordinance No. 79 of 1948 “An Ordinance to Provide for the 
Organization, Discipline, Powers and Duties of the Police Force” (subsequent amendments did not make  substantial 
changes). Oversight of discipline was strictly hierarchical. “Superior officers” (ranks above assistant  superintendent) 
investigated cases of misconduct and if they found officers guilty, imposed punishments. To an overwhelming 
degree, the Police Force (and our sample) consisted of “subordinate officers” such as constables, corporals, and 
sergeants. Article 41 lists 44 categories of offenses; Article 43 lists the punishments ranging from reprimands, 
fines,  withdrawal of efficiency allowances, extra drills, confinement to barracks to demotion. Harsher sentences, 
including dismissals, could be imposed by the police commissioner. Officers had the right to appeal. We do not have 
 information about who provided the evidence or accusation. Many offenses such as absenteeism and disobedience 
are internal and would let us assume that evidence was put forward by higher ranked officers within the police. 
Veteran police officers confirmed this in our interviews. 
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Table 1— Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard  
deviation Observations
Police officer’s conduct
Offense (0 –1) 0.192 0.394 44,689
Absent (0 –1) 0.077 0.267 44,689
Drunk (0 –1) 0.024 0.153 44,689
Dirty or untidy (0 –1) 0.019 0.135 44,689
Disobedient (0 –1) 0.020 0.140 44,689
Serious offense (0 –1) 0.021 0.144 44,689
Commendable behavior (0 –1) 0.004 0.066 44,689
Number of offenses 0.255 0.604 44,689
Police officer’s ethnic group
Gema (0 –1) 0.208 0.406 44,689
Kamatusa (0 –1) 0.292 0.454 44,689
Luo (0 –1) 0.078 0.268 44,689
KANU (0 –1) 0.409 0.492 44,689
Kikuyu (0 –1) 0.132 0.338 44,689
Kalenjin (0 –1) 0.222 0.415 44,689
Police officer’s ethnic group and characteristics of division where stationed
Stationed in ethnic homeland (0 –1) 0.170 0.376 41,449
Stationed in district of birth (0 –1) 0.092 0.289 39,653
Share of co-ethnics in division 0.146 0.110 41,449
Share of co-ethnics in higher ranks 0.146 0.148 41,415
Other background characteristics
Literate (signed booklet) (0 –1) 0.327 0.469 38,917
Any education (0 –1) 0.307 0.461 44,689
Tenure 7.318 5.597 44,689
Rank index (0 –3) 0.179 0.492 44,689
Character assessment  
 at discharge (0 – 4)
2.337 0.993 37,969
Promotion and punishment
Promotion (0 –1) 0.016 0.125 44,689
Dismissal (0 –1) 0.031 0.174 38,427
Resignation (0 –1) 0.022 0.147 38,427
Fine (Ksh) 16.34 21.91 8,561
Any fine (0 –1) 0.767 0.424 8,561
Any punishment (0 –1) 0.871 0.334 8,561
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the individual-year panel of 6,784 police 
 officers serving between 1957 and 1970. The offense variables take value 1 if the  policeman 
was found guilty of that offense at least once in that year. Serious offense includes fighting, 
assaults, theft, discharging a rifle, allowing a prisoner to escape, corruption, and creating a 
 disturbance. Gema (Kamatusa) is a dummy variable indicating whether the policeman’s  ethnic 
group belongs to either Kikuyu, Embu, or Meru (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, or Samburu). 
KANU is a time-varying dummy variable indicating whether the policeman’s ethnic group was 
represented in the KANU party. Stationed in ethnic homeland/home district is a dummy based 
on the location of an officer’s division and his ethnicity/district of birth. Share of an ethnicity 
in higher ranks measures the proportion of senior officers (corporal or above) in the division 
who share the officer’s ethnicity. Literate is approximated by whether the individual has signed 
his service register versus given a thumbprint. Any education refers to attendance of formal 
schooling. Tenure measures the number of years in service. The rank index takes the values 0, 
1, 2, and 3 for a constable, corporal, sergeant, and inspector or above,  respectively. Fines and 
punishment are conditional on committing an offense.
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 punishment dummy are mere “reprimands,” which are the only punishment in about 
13 percent of offenses.
III. Empirical Strategy
A. Identifying the KANU Treatment Effect
Our paper studies how the behavior of policemen changes when their  co-ethnics 
hold political power. The empirical strategy exploit three shocks to political power: 
KANU winning Kenya’s first multiparty elections in 1961, bringing the Luo and 
Gema (led by the Kikuyu) to power; KANU absorbing the Kamatusa  alliance 
(headed by the Kalenjin) in 1964; and the Luo leaving KANU in 1965. As  different 
groups gain and lose political power at different points in time, our main treat-
ment varies across time and ethnic groups. Intuitively, our approach amounts to a 
 difference-in-difference strategy, in which we compare an ethnic group that gains 
power through KANU to a group that does not, and time periods during which this 
group is in power to when it is out of power. As three groups (Gema, Kamatusa, and 
the Luo) gain or lose power at three different points in time (1961, 1964, and 1965), 
we pool three difference-in-difference estimators in our main specification:
(1)  Offense i, e, t = β ×  KANU power i, e, t + γ X i, e, t +  δ e +  λ t +  ϵ i, e, t .
The dependent variable is an indicator of whether policeman  i , of ethnic group  e , 
commits an offense in year  t .18 For the main results, we rely on a binary offense 
measure, for which effects are more precisely estimated than for offense counts.19 
The variable  KANU power i, e, t is a dummy equal to one if a policeman’s ethnic group 
is part of KANU and holds political power. It is equal to one for the Gema from 
1961 onwards, for the Luo between 1961–1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964.
In our sample, policemen enter and leave on a rolling basis. Hence, our first 
 specification does not allow us to identify whether differences in the offense 
 probabilities of KANU policemen are driven by changing behavior of  existing 
 policemen or by selective entry and exit of policemen. Evidence on behavioral change 
comes from the inclusion of individual fixed effects  κ i in our main  specification. 
The corresponding specification becomes
(2)  Offense i, e, t = β ×  KANU power i, e, t +  κ i +  ϵ i, e, t .
In this approach, the estimation of  β relies on individuals who served during both 
regimes: before and while (and/or after) their ethnic group had political power.20 
18 The first and last calendar years of service can be incomplete. We control for the share of the year served 
to account for the mechanical relationship between the time served and the probability of offending in that year. 
Main results without this control are reported in online Appendix Table B.6 and are very similar. 
19 The main result by ethnic group for offense counts are reported in online Appendix Table B.3. 
20 It is natural to restrict the analysis to a balanced panel of policemen in this case, even though the resulting 
sample of policemen is not randomly selected. In the result tables, we report the findings of fixed effects models for 
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Causal identification of the difference-in-difference coefficient  β requires a  common 
trend assumption: i.e., in the absence of political changes, KANU policemen would 
have followed the same trends as the other ethnic groups. Figure 3 provides  evidence 
in support of this assumption. It will be corroborated further through a series of 
 placebo tests in which we will shift the treatment one to three years forward.
To study the mechanisms underlying our main effect  β , we can test whether 
the treatment effect is stronger for policemen with particular characteristics, like 
 serving in one’s ethnic homeland, belonging to the dominant ethnic group at the 
police  division level, rank, and literacy status. We denote such characteristics as 
X i, e, t , and add an interaction term to our main specification:
(3)  Offense  i, e, t = β ×  KANU power i, e, t + ϕ ×  KANU power i, e, t ×  X  i, e, t 
 +  X  i, e, t ×  λ  t + γ ×  X i, e, t ×  KANU ethnic  e +  κ i +  ϵ i, e, t . 
both the full sample and a balanced panel. 
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Figure 3. Offense Probability of KANU Groups and Other Ethnicities
Notes: This figure plots the offense probability of police officers, split by ethnic groups  affiliated 
 versus not affiliated with KANU, and the difference between those groups. Panel A focuses on the 
Gema alliance, which came to power in 1961 and remained in power throughout the 1960s. Panel B 
focuses on the Kamatusa alliance, which joined KANU in 1964; panel C  concentrates on the Luo, 
which were part of KANU between 1961–1965. “Never KANU” includes officers of ethnic groups 
that were never part of KANU, that is excluding the Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo throughout 1957–
1970. Panel D focuses on KANU as a whole. “KANU” is a time varying variable including officers 
of ethnic groups affiliated with KANU in a given year, and “Non-KANU” includes officers of ethnic 
groups that were not part of KANU in that year.
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The variable ϕ measures the differential effect of  KANU power depending on 
the level of the characteristic  X  i, e, t . Identification of ϕ is challenging, because the 
 interaction term risks picking up general  time-varying or  ethnicity-specific effects of 
X i, e, t . For  example,  X  i, e, t is a dummy for serving in one’s home region; the estima-
tion of ϕ would be biased if Gema officers generally perform worse in their home-
land (even before KANU holds political power), or police officers regardless of their 
ethnicity  perform increasingly worse in their homeland over time. Therefore, it is 
important to control flexibly for heterogenous effects of the characteristics  X  i, e, t . 
Time-varying effects of  X  i, e, t are captured by  λ  t . The coefficient  γ captures the time-in-
variant  differential effect of  X i, e, t for the three ethnic groups that were part of KANU (Luo, Kamatusa, and Gema, which we indicate with a dummy  KANU  ethnic e ).21 
This   flexible  control strategy also allows us to test whether these characteristics 
 mediate the  treatment effect. For example, the assignment of  particular groups to their 
homelands could respond to the treatment. It also helps us to rule out  time-varying 
effects that lead to violations of the common trend  assumption. For  example, 
KANU officers could be more educated, and educated policemen could become 
less well-behaved after independence, regardless of political power. This concern is 
relevant because certain socioeconomic differences between ethnic groups existed 
before 1961.22
B. Reporting Concerns
Our reliance on reported rather than independently observed offenses has  obvious 
limitations. It is conceivable that the recording of offenses for politically powerful 
ethnic groups changes even if actual behavior remains unaltered. While we cannot 
rule out such a reporting effect a priori, a number of factors support our  interpretation 
of the recorded offenses as a reflection of actual behavior.
 •  The registers were kept for internal use only. Interviews with retired police 
 officers confirmed that record keeping had been accurate and complete.
 •  The most senior police officers (who were often European, even after 
 independence) had built up their careers during the colonial period, which 
ensured consistency in administrative records and reporting practices.
 •  Systematic misreporting for particular ethnic groups has to be implemented by 
senior officers, but we find no evidence that the ethnic composition of the senior 
officer corps matters for the misbehavior we document.
 •  One would expect reporting bias in the direction that politically powerful 
groups have less recorded offenses for the same behavior. Our findings go in 
the opposite direction: KANU policemen have more recorded offenses.
 •  There is a certain discretion in how to punish a given offense: fines of  varying 
amounts, dismissal, or delayed promotion. Punishments offer a more  effective 
21 Note that we can only estimate  γ for time-varying characteristics  X  i, e, t , as time-invariant characteristics like 
literacy would be absorbed by the individual fixed effects. 
22 In online Appendix Table B.1, we show that before 1961 KANU officers differed significantly from other 
ethnic groups. 
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and powerful instrument for ethnic discrimination. However, we do not find a 
differential treatment in punishments.
 •  We can break down the offenses, and compare results for more objective 
offenses (like absenteeism and drunkenness), and more subjective offenses. Our 
results are strongest for objective offenses. Similarly, we do not find  evidence 
of  differential “commendable behavior,” which arguably is even more at the 
discretion of senior officers.
The results referred to in this list are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. 
Taken together, we think our findings are inconsistent with a view that systematic 
misreporting generated differential misconduct for KANU policemen.
IV. Main Results
Figure 3 shows the annual offense probability of KANU officers, non-KANU 
officers, and the difference together with its 95 percent confidence interval. It nicely 
illustrates our main result. Panel A shows the pattern for the Gema, panel B for the 
Kamatusa, panel C for the Luo, and panel D for all KANU (i.e., Gema, Kamatusa, 
and Luo) officers. The dashed vertical lines  separate the time periods in which an 
ethnic group holds to power through KANU, from  periods out of power. 
Between 1957 and the first election in 1961, differences in offense probability 
between ethnic groups are statistically indistinguishable from and close to zero. 
After the first election, the difference in offense rates in the Gema, Luo, and KANU 
graphs are greater than zero and the confidence interval includes zero only at the 
 margin. We see a similar pattern for Kamatusa officers: once KANU absorbed 
KADU in 1964, their offense probability increases compared to non-KANU 
 officers. This  difference persists throughout the time period, with the 95 percent 
confidence interval  including zero only at the margin. Moreover, we see a  reversal 
of the pattern when an officer’s ethnic group leaves power: the difference in offense 
probability between Luo and non-KANU officers becomes negative and  statistically 
indistinguishable from zero after 1965. The difference in offense probabilities is 
substantively  meaningful. While the average offense likelihood of all police officers 
increases after the first election, the increase for KANU officers is considerably 
larger. Between 1961 and 1970, the probability of a  non-KANU officer  committing 
at least one offense in a given year increased from 14 percent to 21 percent per year 
(i.e., a 40 percent increase), whereas the likelihood of a KANU officer  committing at 
least one offense in a given year rises from 15 percent to 25 percent (i.e., a 67  percent 
increase) during the same time period.
In Table 2, we move beyond the graphical analysis and employ the  regression 
framework specified in the previous section. Here,  KANU power is a  time-varying 
dummy variable indicating when officers belong to an ethnic group that is in power 
through KANU. Column  1 presents the results from a simple linear  probability 
model  including only year fixed effects and a control for the share of the year served. 
Column 2 of Table 2 also includes ethnic fixed effects, and columns 3–5 present the 
results including  individual fixed effects on three different samples: the full  sample 
 including all officers serving at any point between 1957 and 1970, the stacked 
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 sample  including officers serving continuously throughout at least one of three 
time  windows around each political change, and the balanced sample  including all 
 officers who have served continuously throughout 1958–1968.
Columns 1–5 of Table 2 confirm the pattern shown in panel D of Figure 3: on 
 average a KANU officer is between 2.7 and 3.8 percentage points more likely 
to commit an offense than a non-KANU officer in any given year after 1961. 
This  difference in offense rate is remarkably robust to the inclusion of different fixed 
effects and changes to the sample. Most importantly, the individual fixed effects 
results in columns  3–5 indicate that almost all of the differences in offense rate 
between KANU and non-KANU officers is due to behavioral changes, i.e., the same 
officers performing worse. This rules out selection mechanisms, such as the entry of 
less qualified officers or the exiting of the best KANU officers postindependence.23
Table  3 presents placebo regressions using the full sample as in Table  2, 
 column 3.24 Columns 1–3 of Table 3 move the time-varying KANU power variable 
forward by one, two, and three years, respectively. The placebo interactions are 
 statistically  indistinguishable from zero and small compared to the size of the coef-
ficient  estimates of  interest. Moreover, the differences between the KANU power 
 variable and the various  placebos are consistently positive and significantly different 
23 Online Appendix Table B.2 reestimates columns 1–3 of Table 2 using the extended time period 1950–1980. 
The sample in our main analysis stops in 1970 because our data do not include any policemen who entered after 
1970. The results in Appendix Table B.2 are qualitatively similar. Online Appendix Table  B.3 reestimates col-
umns 1–5 of Table 2 using the number of offenses committed in a year rather than our preferred dichotomous 
measure. Panel A presents the OLS and panel B the Poisson regression results. Again, we find that KANU officers 
are significantly more likely to commit offenses in both specifications. 
24 The placebo effects are qualitatively similar using the stacked and balanced samples. These results are 
reported in online Appendix Table B.5, which also includes an alternative placebo measure. 
Table 2—Difference in Offense Probabilities between KANU and Non-KANU Officers
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KANU ethnic 0.002
(0.006)
KANU power 0.038 0.035 0.028 0.033 0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Ethnic group FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44,689 44,689 44,689 18,567 13,266
Clusters 6,784 6,784 6,784 2,053 1,206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense probabilities. 
The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU ethnic 
is a time invariant dummy variable taking the value 1 for ethnic groups that were part of KANU (Luo, Kamatusa, 
and Gema). KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 
1961–1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. The “full” panel (columns 1–3) includes all policemen in the sample 
serving between 1957 and 1970. The “stacked” panel (column 4) takes the union of four balanced panels around 
each transition: [1958, 1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962, 1968] for the Kamatusa transition in 
1964; and [1964, 1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced panel (column 5) takes all policemen serving 
continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the 
year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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from zero. These  insignificant placebos support the pattern in panel C of Figure 3: 
while there is no statistically discernible difference in offense rates between KANU 
and non-KANU policemen in the years before the first Kenyan multiparty election 
in 1961, there is a clear difference thereafter.
Table 4 presents separate regressions for each of the three main ethnic groups 
within KANU. Panels  A, B, and C show the results for the Gema alliance, the 
Kamatusa alliance, and the Luo, respectively. Columns 1–3 report the results from 
individual fixed effects regressions on the three different samples we use in Table 2. 
Column 4 reports the impact of the groups’ entry to power in a balanced panel that 
is specific to each group. Finally, column 5 estimates the effect of the Luo’s exit 
from power. The results confirm the patterns shown in Figure 3. Gema officers are 
between 3.2  percent and 5.1 percent and significantly more likely to commit offenses 
than non-KANU officers after the first election. The same holds true for Kamatusa 
 officers: upon joining the KANU coalition in 1964, they are between 1.4 percent and 
2.6 percent more likely to commit an offense in a given year than non-KANU offi-
cers,  depending on the specification. Finally, the pattern for Luo officers is a bit more 
nuanced due to their entrance and exit of power during the time period under inves-
tigation. A Luo officer is between 2.5 percent and 4.4  percent more likely to com-
mit an offense than non-KANU officers between 1961 and 1965. But upon leaving 
the KANU coalition, their probability of committing an offense drops by 9  percent 
compared to Gema and Kamatusa officers, which is  statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. Overall, these results suggest that a behavioral shift accounts for the 
observed ethnic differentials in discipline. Finally, we  investigate whether the effect 
differs by type of offense. Figure 4  summarizes the effects,  relying on an  individual 
Table 3—Placebo Regressions ( full sample)
Offense
(1) (2) (3)
KANU power 0.028 0.028 0.030
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
KANU power  
 (1 year forward)
0.000
(0.012)
KANU power  
 (2 years forward) −0.001(0.010)
KANU power  
 (3 years forward)
0.003
(0.010)
Observations 44,689 44,689 44,689
Clusters 6,784 6,784 6,784
Wald test 0.028 0.028 0.027
KANU power — Placebo (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Notes: This table presents the results from placebo regression models for the full  individual-year 
panel data of policemen serving between 1957 and 1970. The dependent variable is an 
 indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. The placebo terms shift 
the KANU power variable one, two, and three years forward. KANU power is a time varying 
variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961–1965, and for the 
Kamatusa after 1964. Additional placebo results are reported in online Appendix Tables B.4 
and B.5. All regressions include year and individual fixed effects, and control for share of the 
year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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fixed effects regression. The increased  misbehavior is strongest for more  objective 
acts of misconduct.25 It appears to be driven by absenteeism and  drunkenness. 
Effects are small for the most subjective offense type: disobedience. In addition, we 
do not see an effect of the KANU treatment on “ commendable  behavior.” Recorded 
good behavior is much rarer in our sample than bad  behavior (there are just 208 
such cases; it includes, for example, “solving crimes” and “ arresting criminals”). 
It again is an outcome of which the reporting ( conditional on  behavior) should be 
more at the discretion of the senior officers than the reporting of bad behavior. The 
corresponding coefficient is insignificant, so KANU officers do not seem to behave 
more “commendably.” Overall, these results alleviate concerns of biased reporting 
by senior officers.
25 One caveat to this interpretation is that these types of misbehavior are also easier to observe, and could 
 therefore be more responsive to shocks in general. 
Table 4 —Difference in Offense Probabilities by Ethnic Groups within KANU
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Gema (excluding Kamatusa and Luo from the sample)
Gema  × post 61 0.032 0.050 0.051 0.051
(0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Time period [1957, 1970] [1958, 1968] [1958, 1968] [1958,1968]
Sample Full Stacked Balanced Balanced
Observations 28,134 11,700 8,503 8,503
Clusters 4,358 1,298 773 773
Panel B. Kamatusa (excluding Gema and Luo from the sample)
Kamatusa   
 × post 64
0.026 0.024 0.014 0.022
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Time period [1957, 1970] [1958, 1968] [1958, 1968] [1962, 1968]
Sample Full Stacked Balanced Balanced
Observations 31,909 13,230 10,153 8,988
Clusters 4,647 1,394 923 1,284
Panel C. Luo (excluding Gema and Kamatusa from the sample (columns 1–4 )) 
(including only Luo, Gema, and Kamatusa (column 5))
Luo  × post 61 0.044 0.069 0.063 0.025
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028)
Luo  × post 65 −0.090
(0.032)
Time period [1957, 1970] [1958, 1968] [1958, 1968] [1958, 1963] [1964, 1968]
Sample Full Stacked Balanced Balanced Balanced
Observations 22,336 9,407 8,184 4,464 6,330
Clusters 3,195 935 744 744 1,266
Notes: This table presents results separately for each of the three ethnic groups and coalitions comprising KANU 
between 1961 and 1970. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a 
given year. The top, middle, and lower panel looks at changes in the behavior of policemen ethnically  affiliated to 
the Gema alliance, Kamatusa alliance, and Luo, respectively. The “full” panel (column 1) includes all  policemen 
in the  sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The “stacked” panel (column 2) takes the union of four  balanced 
 panels around each transition: [1958, 1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962, 1968] for the Kamatusa 
 transition in 1964; and [1964, 1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced panel (column  3) takes all 
 policemen  serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. Column  4 reports the impact of the groups’ entry to 
power in a  balanced panel specific to each group. Column 5 estimates the effect of the Luo’s exit from power. All 
regressions include year and individual fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level.
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V. Mechanisms
A. Division and Individual Characteristics
While the fixed effect analysis of Table 2 accounts for a large set of  confounding 
factors, the results could still capture the impact of time-varying  characteristics that 
correlate with ethnicity. In addition, responsiveness to the KANU power  treatment 
may vary with the background and assignment characteristics of  policemen. 
Studying such heterogeneous effects could help us to uncover the mechanism 
through which political dominance affects behavior. This section explores the role 
of these division-level and individual-level characteristics, following the empirical 
strategy described in Section IIIA (equation 3).
First, the changing behavior observed in Table 2 could be the result of peer effects 
and the assignment of KANU officers to divisions with poorer discipline after 
1961. The police records track assignment to 30 police district divisions. Table 5 
 introduces police division-year fixed effects in addition to individual fixed effects. 
Even in this demanding specification, using only within-division-year variation, we 
find that policemen behave worse when their ethnic group holds political power 
through KANU.26 Hence, division-level peer effects cannot account for the poor 
performance of KANU officers.
26 Division-level measures of ethnic diversity and the General Service Unit (the most political police unit) 
are not driving the results (online Appendix Tables  B.20 and B.18), nor do they strengthen the KANU power 
effect. More generally, online Appendix Figure A.11 shows that our main treatment effect is very similar across 
Figure 4. Effect of KANU Power Treatment on Different Offense Outcomes
Notes: The figure plots coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from our main 
specification with individual fixed effects in the full sample of 6,784 policemen and the 
 balanced panel of 1,206 policemen. Coefficients and confidence intervals are scaled by the 
sample mean of the corresponding offense type. Unscaled regression results can be found in 
online Appendix Table B.8.
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Second, political dominance could affect the pattern of postings, and being 
 stationed close to home or co-ethnics may matter for performance. A  priori, 
the  effect of serving in one’s homeland is not clear-cut. On the one hand, more 
leisure  opportunities could make officers more likely to shirk. The local political 
power of one’s ethnic group will also be stronger in the homelands, which could 
strengthen the KANU power effect.27 On the other hand, it might make  policemen 
keener to keep their jobs, and serving far away from one’s home might reduce work 
 satisfaction (Dal BÓ, Finan, and Rossi 2012).28 Panel A in Figure 5 investigates the 
role of being stationed in one’s ethnic homeland. It shows that the main treatment 
effect is not larger for KANU officers serving in their homeland, nor driven by 
time-varying or ethnicity-specific effects of serving in one’s homeland (for which 
we control in the underlying specification). Similarly, panel B finds no evidence of 
differential effects of being stationed in one’s district of birth.29
Third, the KANU effect may arise because of the numerical dominance of one’s 
own ethnic group in the workplace, i.e., among officers within the police division. 
The panels C and D in Figure 5 test this. Neither a measure of overall numerical 
strength, nor measures of dominance of one’s ethnic group among the higher officer 
divisions—the average treatment effect is always included in the confidence intervals around the division-specific 
treatment effects. 
27 The ethnic homeland variable proxies for the local political strength of an ethnic group, because ethnicities of 
elected Members of Parliament already closely followed the ethnic composition of constituencies in 1963 (Hornsby 
1989). 
28 Being stationed in homelands could also improve interactions of the police with the local population 
(Lyall 2010). Of course, our measure of performance is strictly internal. 
29 The corresponding online Appendix Tables B.9 and B.10 include different measures of being posted in one’s 
home region—again, these cannot explain the changing behavior of KANU policemen. 
Table 5 —Division-Year Fixed Effects
Offense
(1) (2) (3)
KANU power 0.031 0.034 0.026
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
Division-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 41,449 17,882 13,056
Clusters  6,146  1,966  1,191
Notes: This table reestimates the OLS regressions reported in Table 2, columns 3–5, but includes 
division-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by 
a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying  variable that switches to 1 for the 
Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961–1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. The “full” 
panel (column  1) includes all policemen in the sample  serving between 1957 and 1970. 
The “stacked” panel (column 2) takes the union of four balanced panels around each  transition: 
[1958, 1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962, 1968] for the Kamatusa transition 
in 1964; and [1964, 1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The  balanced panel ( column 3) takes 
all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All  regressions include  individual 
and division-year fixed effects, and control for the share of the  year served. Observations 
 without division information are dropped from the  sample. Standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level.
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Figure 5. Heterogeneous Effects
Notes: This figure shows coefficient estimates and their 95 percent confidence intervals from our 
main specification and the full sample, interacting KANU power with one of eight  covariates, 
and adding KANU-ethnicity-covariate effects as well as year-covariate effects (as described 
in Section  IIIA.) The ethnic homeland, home district, ethnic dominance, rank, literacy, and 
schooling measures are described in Section IIB and Table 1. Prior offenses is a dummy for 
whether the officer has committed any offenses before 1961. The ethnic dominance measures 
are standardized in the corresponding interaction terms. Full regression results can be found in 
online Appendix Tables B.9, B.10, B.11, B.15, B.16, B.17, and B.22.
KANU power
KANU power
× homeland
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 −0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Panel A. Stationed in ethnic homeland
KANU power
KANU power
× home district
Panel B. Stationed in home district
KANU power
KANU power
× division ethnic 
share
−0.10−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Panel C. Ethnic dominance in division
KANU power
KANU power
× ethnic share
corporals
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Panel D. Ethnic dominance in corporals
KANU power
KANU power
× rank
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Panel E. Ranks (0−3 scale)
KANU power
KANU power
× literate
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Panel F. Literacy
KANU power
KANU power
× any schooling
−0.10−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 −0.10−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Panel G. Schooling
KANU power
KANU power
× no prior 
offenses
Panel H. Prior offenses
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ranks are significant.30 There is no evidence of the opposite hypothesis either: that 
officers misbehave more when they are matched to seniors from other ethnicities, 
either because such a mismatch is conducive for misbehavior, or because senior 
 officers are more likely to report the offenses of non-co-ethnic juniors when the 
latter’s ethnic group is in power. We also examine the importance of KANU-specific 
peer effects, by interacting the treatment with the share of KANU officers in the 
division in a given year. While the coefficient on this interaction term is positive, it is 
not consistently significant.31
Finally, panels E–H in Figure 5 examine the role of individual  characteristics. A 
policeman’s rank does not affect the KANU power effect. It is interesting to note that 
the increased offenses are not driven by lower ranks (which would imply a negative 
interaction). Hence, it seems unlikely, for example, that KANU policemen are bul-
lied into misbehavior by higher level officers. In contrast, the KANU power effect is 
clearly stronger for better educated policemen. We use two measures of educational 
background. First, the personnel records show whether the recruit signed or thumb-
printed his service register, which is a proxy for  literacy (Rachal 1987). We also 
have information about whether the policeman has any  formal schooling, which is 
the case for about 38 percent of our sample. It is possible that literate policemen are 
more responsive to the KANU power treatment because they are more politically 
aware. Alternatively, literate policemen could have better outside options, for real or 
perceived. The plausibility of outside options as a driver of shirking behavior will 
be explored further in the next subsection. In panel H of Figure 5, we show evidence 
that the KANU effect is driven by officers  without prior offenses in the pretreatment 
period (1957–1960). So, our results do not appear to be driven by bad officers get-
ting worse.
B. Promotion and Punishment
One way to rationalize the increased misconduct of KANU officers is that the 
police apply different disciplining standards. Members of politically powerful  ethnic 
groups may be punished less for misconduct, through promotion  opportunities, 
fines, or dismissals. We will test if these responses change when ethnic groups lose 
or gain power through KANU.
In Table 6, column 1, we test how offenses in a policeman’s career affect his 
 promotion prospects. In general, higher past offense rates make promotions less 
likely and dismissals or resignations more likely. But there is no evidence that 
KANU officers are promoted or dismissed differently, both when they do and when 
they do not have an offense history. An additional offense makes promotion 1.5 and 
1.7 percentage points less likely for non-KANU and KANU officers,  respectively, 
after 1961 (column 1 of Table 6). So KANU officers are punished slightly more for 
30 In line with the idea that dominance at the very top of the police organization matters, we also look at the 
interaction of our treatment variable with an indicator for whether the “Provincial Police Officer”—the officer com-
manding a police region (combining multiple police divisions) is from the same ethnic group. This interaction is 
positive, but not significant (online Appendix Table B.19). We also do not find consistent evidence for nonlinearities 
in measures of ethnic dominance, as shown in online Appendix Table B.12. 
31 Results reported in online Appendix Tables B.13 and B.14. 
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offenses on average, but the 0.2 percentage point difference is small and insignifi-
cant. Moreover, the 95  percent confidence interval rules out a sensitivity that is 0.4 
percentage points lower for KANU officers. An additional offense increases the dis-
missal probability by 13  percentage points for non-KANU officers after 1961 (col-
umn 3). The 95  percent confidence interval rules out that the dismissal  sensitivity 
for KANU officers is less than 3.4 percentage points lower. Overall, the career pun-
ishments for offenses appear very similar regardless of whether an officer’s ethnic 
group holds political power through KANU. One way to reconcile these results 
with the increased offense probabilities of KANU officers is through better outside 
options. If KANU  policemen easily find a job, e.g., benefiting from political patron-
age  outside the police, the threat of dismissals loses bite. They could be willing to 
shirk and carry the risk of dismissal. However, the resignation results in columns 5 
and 6 do not appear to confirm this interpretation. KANU policemen are not more 
likely to resign voluntarily.
Finally, Table 7 analyzes punishment. The first two columns focus on fine amounts, 
while the latter two columns focus on whether an officer was punished at all (fined, 
reprimanded, demoted, dismissed) immediately after an offense. In  both cases, 
we include a comprehensive set of controls for the number and types of offenses 
 committed as well as officer characteristics, in order to capture  differential  treatment 
of KANU officers. For both fine amounts and the punishment  indicator, there is 
no evidence of preferential treatment. The absence of favoritism in the immediate 
punishments also mitigates the broader concern of reporting bias to some extent. 
If senior officers try to make life harder for KANU groups, one would expect them 
Table 6 — Career Progression Conditional on Conduct
Promotion Dismissal Resignation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
cumulative offense rate (per year) −0.015 0.129 0.014
(0.002) (0.011) (0.004)
 KANU power × cumulative  
 offense rate 
−0.002 −0.004 −0.007 −0.004 −0.008 −0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.019) (0.005) (0.009)
 Pre 61 dummy × cumulative  
 offense rate  
−0.004 0.032 0.009
(0.003) (0.015) (0.007)
Offense -KANU ethnic fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Offense -Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 44,689 44,689 38,427 38,427 38,427 38,427
Clusters 6,784 6,784 5,792 5,792 5,792 5,792
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s past offense rate on promotion, dismissal, and resignation 
 probability in the full individual-year panel data of policemen serving between 1957 and 1970. KANU power 
is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961–1965, and for the 
Kamatusa after 1964. The cumulative offense rate is measured as the number of offenses in the past divided by 
 tenure (number of years in service). Offense-KANU ethnic fixed effects interact the cumulative offense rate  variable 
with a dummy equal to 1 for all ethnicities that were ever part of KANU. The outcome in columns 1 and 2 is a rank 
index taking values between 0 and 3, in columns 3 and 4 it is a dummy for dismissal, and in  columns 5 and 6 it is a 
dummy for resignation. All regressions include year, tenure, ethnic group fixed effects, and control for the share of 
the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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to increase punishments conditional on offenses as well. There is no evidence of 
such discriminatory treatment.
VI. Discussion
Based on our findings, we can rule out that the KANU effect is driven by worse 
recruits entering the police force. Instead, specifications with officer fixed effects 
show that individuals change their behavior when their group comes to power. 
The results in Table 5 and Figure 5 indicate that the KANU effect cannot be attributed 
to the place of posting or to the ethnic composition at the division level. The police 
does not seem to discriminate KANU officers positively or negatively. When KANU 
policemen offend, they are not promoted, dismissed, or fined differently, as shown 
in Tables 6 and 7. But then, why would policemen change their behavior when their 
ethnic group is in power?
If incentives for misbehavior are not internal to the police, they could still be 
external, through improved outside options.32 But, the historical context suggests 
that police jobs were relatively attractive (N’Diaye 2002, Potholm 1969). As an 
 illustration, the salary of constables exceeded the one of primary school  teachers 
even though the latter had to fulfil strict educational requirements (Republic of 
Kenya 1967). The relative attractiveness of police jobs could have insulated  officers 
from improved outside options. While we lack data on the job market  prospects of 
 ex-policemen, we do observe voluntary resignations. If KANU officers fare much 
better in the general labor market, we would expect them to leave the police more 
often. Table 6 suggests that this did not happen. This is mild (but not  conclusive) 
 evidence against outside career options driving our findings. An   alternative 
 explanation is that the improved prospects for KANU officers are linked to their 
32 To assess the potential improvement of outside options, police recruitment patterns are interesting in their 
own right. Online Appendix Figure A.5 shows that the proportion of ethnic groups in the force are unrelated to the 
political changes we exploit. 
Table 7— Punishment
log(Fine) Any punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KANU power 0.015 0.011 0.001 −0.001
(0.009) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Ethnic group FE Yes No Yes No
Individual FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 44,689 44,689 44,689 44,689
Clusters 6,784 6,784 6,784 6,784
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s affiliation with KANU on fines and other 
forms of punishment for the full sample period (1957–1970). KANU power is a time varying 
variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961–1965, and for the 
Kamatusa after 1964. log(Fine) is calculated as log(Fine + 1). All regressions include  tenure 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, offense type fixed effects (using the types from Figure 5), 
and interactions of each offense type with a dummy equal to 1 for all ethnicities that were ever 
part of KANU. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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role in the police—for example, if they have more opportunities to participate in 
 corrupt activities. Such behavior could explain the increase in absenteeism, but only 
if policemen are willing to trade off these earning opportunities against the risk 
of missing promotions or even dismissal. It is also harder to reconcile increased 
 drunkenness with this explanation.
One mechanism that we cannot test directly, but is consistent with all of our 
 findings, is an emboldenment effect of political power. Political shocks might prime 
ethnic superiority, and lead to worse discipline, even if the objective and  material 
 incentives for such behavior do not change. It is hard to prove directly that we are 
 capturing the mere priming of ethnic dominance—we are naturally  constrained by our 
 historical data. Still, the historical literature provides useful cues. The  organizational 
 continuity of the police in the early independence period was ensured in part by 
British officers who kept on serving in the Kenyan police  throughout the 1960s 
(Sinclair 2006). This factor may explain the absence of favoritism toward KANU 
within the police management. However, ethnic politics encroached Kenyan society 
at large. The  historical literature is very explicit about the effects of  political power 
on the (self-)image of ethnic groups. Describing the Gema group in the 1960s, 
Hornsby (2012, 258) writes: 
It was now clear that the Kikuyu and to a lesser extent their Mount Kenya 
neighbours in Embu and Meru were embedding a sense of preeminence in 
their collective Kenya. There was a growing assumption of their right to 
rule. Many Kikuyu believed they were smarter, more entrepreneurial and 
had suffered more under colonialism.
As for the Luo, Stubbs (2015, 71) describes the impact of their exclusion from KANU 
in 1965 as follows: “[T]he Luo ethnic group lost significant status among Kenyan 
society and soon came to be viewed as second-class citizens.” These  historical 
 references confirm that the political changes we study provoked effects beyond the 
mere adherence to the KANU party: they altered the  self-image and  status of ethnic 
groups. Our results indicate that this increased salience of  ethnic identities affected 
job performance and individual behavior. Interestingly, this  mechanism operates 
in the absence of clear career incentives, so that we can  interpret this result as an 
emboldenment effect triggered by political shocks.
Our preferred interpretation of the results fits well into a set of recent findings 
in the literature on the economics of ethnic identity. The 2015 World Development 
Report highlights the importance of “mental models” in shaping behavior (World 
Bank 2015). While mental models are often assumed to be deeply rooted, recent 
work shows important behavioral effects of priming ethnic identities. For  example, 
in a randomized control trial in India, Hoff and Pandey (2012) finds that lower 
caste school children perform worse when their caste is mentioned before taking a 
test—while there is no difference in performance when identities are not primed. 
Encouraging marginalized groups to contemplate positive identities has also been 
shown to increase interest in anti-poverty programs (Cohen et al. 2009).33 In a recent 
33 See World Bank (2015) for an overview of work on priming social norms. For example, La Ferrara, Chong, 
and Duryea (2012) finds that exposure to soap operas in Brazil affect fertility choices. 
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contribution, Depetris-Chauvin and Durante (2017) finds that  unexpected  football 
victories prime national identities at the expense of ethnic identities and help to 
reduce conflict. Our paper adds to this literature, as it shows the costs  associated 
with events that prime (ethnic) political dominance.
VII. External Validity
Our analysis ends in 1970. Ethnic politics continued to feature prominently in 
Kenya, although under varying conditions. In 1969, Kenya became a single-party 
state. After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi succeeded and the  political 
coalition shifted. Moi diverted resources and patronage to his own Kalenjin  ethnic 
group and his allies among the Luhya and coastal ethnic groups (Throup 1993, 
Burgess et al. 2015). Many senior Kikuyu police officers were replaced by  members 
of ethnic groups loyal to Moi (Widner 1992, Hornsby 2012). In 1993, Kenya 
returned to multiparty elections. Burgess et al. (2015) found that periods of autoc-
racy (1970–1992) exhibited stronger clientilistic allocation of public goods. In our 
 context, the transition to autocracy could have amplified  feelings of  emboldenment. 
When we extend our analysis to the 1971–1980 period, the  differential rates of 
 misconducts do not respond to these changes but remain stable (online Appendix 
Figure A.6). Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to put much weight on this 
finding. Our sample lacks new entries of policemen after 1970, and as policemen 
exit, the sample is subject to increased selection.34
The service quality of the Kenya Police Force has demonstrably deteriorated 
over time while ethnic discord deepened. In 2013, Kenyans perceived the police 
as the most corrupt among all their state institutions, with 95 percent of survey 
respondents stating that the police “is corrupt or extremely corrupt” (Hardoon and 
Heinrich 2013). At the same time, the police is perceived as highly  inefficient in 
preventing and detecting crime (Anderson 2002, Ruteere 2011, Okia 2011, and 
Akech  2005). The failure and shortcomings of the police, as well as the  ethnic 
dimension, are most well-documented for the 2007–2008 postelection ethnic 
clashes that followed after the disputed victory of Kibaki over Odinga that left 
1,133 dead and about 350,000 people displaced (Waki 2008). The Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative has assessed that “police criminality and misconduct are 
based on  impunity” (Hills 2009). The period shortly after independence may have 
been  special in that the police was still operating under the old regime, but this 
shows that ethnic politics affect police performance even in contexts where sanction 
 mechanisms are  relatively intact and nondiscriminatory.
Under which conditions would the results of our paper apply to other  contexts? 
The police may be exceptional compared to other bureaucracies. It is an  instrument 
of regime protection and therefore vulnerable to political interference (Hassan 2017, 
Hills 2009). It may also have a distinct esprit de corps. Nevertheless, we think there 
are two main scope conditions for our findings: security forces—or a  bureaucracy—
composed of different ethnic groups ; and a shock in the perceived political  importance 
34 The sample becomes smaller and smaller. The size of our sample is 3,112 in 1960, 3,398 in 1970, and just 
1,022 in 1980. 
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of ethnic groups. Many African countries started with an ethnic imbalance in the army 
and police forces as a legacy of British colonial practices to recruit among so-called 
“martial races” (Clayton 1989, Hills 2000). But even  underrepresentative bureaucra-
cies, as documented by François, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015), high  ethnic fractional-
ization in African populations means that the first  condition is almost always met. 
There are also several historical accounts of “ marginalization,” i.e., the loss of political 
power by particular groups. Dresang (1974) reports  survey  evidence for Zambia in 
1967, when the Bemba  ethnic group attained predominance in the ruling party. He 
shows that roughly 40 percent of the Lozi and other small ethnic groups in the civil 
service believed that they were mistreated because of their  ethnicity. Because there 
has been no  preferential  treatments in development  expenditures, Dresang (1974) con-
cludes that “[W]hat may be relevant (…) is the belief that Bemba dominance exists; 
not the actual extent of its existence.” Similarly, Brown (1999) describes how, after a 
change in the  ethnically based  ruling party, mistrust among ethnic groups paralized the 
civil service in Trinidad and Guyana. These emotive responses to political exclusion 
are in line with the results we document for the Kenyan police.
VIII. Conclusions
During Kenya’s political transition, KANU emerged as the dominant  political 
power, absorbing or outlawing its competitors. While favoritism and political 
patronage have been documented in previous research on Kenya (e.g., Burgess 
et  al. 2015, Kramon and Posner 2016), our paper leverages unique data on the 
 day-to-day  behavior of individual public servants in one of the most important  public 
 administrations: the police. Using individual records of 6,784 Kenyan  policemen 
between 1957 and 1970, we find that after the first multiparty election in 1961 
police officers from ethnicities associated with KANU start conducting offenses at 
a  significantly higher rate than non-KANU officers. Investigating this result further, 
we show that this is not due to selecting worse recruits or exiting of particularly 
good performing  officers, but due to a change in behavior of the same individuals 
after 1961. This shift in behavior does not seem to be driven or strengthened by the 
characteristics of the divisions in which these policemen were serving, but seems 
to be more prominent in literate and more highly educated officers. Finding no 
 evidence of differential promotion or punishment between KANU and non-KANU, 
we dismiss mechanisms relying on outside options based on political patronage 
appointments. Instead, our findings seem to be consistent with an emboldenment 
effect. The emergence of ethnic politics influenced the behavior of those officers 
ethnically associated with the ruling party.
The micro-evidence of this paper suggests that ethnic politics shape public service 
provision, not just through the direct allocation of public goods, but also through 
the behavior of ethnic groups within the state’s bureaucracy. This also means that 
civil servants are not insulated from political shocks to the salience of their ethnic 
 identities. In light of these findings, we think that the political environment should 
be considered among the key determinants of bureaucratic performance, alongside 
more “classical” determinants like selection, incentives, and monitoring —the three 
main factors put forward by Finan, Olken, and Pande (2017).
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What are the policy implications of our findings? Many African countries 
aim to rebuild and form the public service into a “representative  bureaucracy.”35 
In  practice, this invariably means in proportion to population shares of  ethnicities. 
Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015) documents such proportionality at higher 
 levels of  government more generally in Africa. But, in the context of our paper, it 
is not the uneven representation of different ethnic groups in the police force that 
drives  underperformance. It is behavioral effects triggered by political  dominance. 
These effects may be long-lasting. It is less straightforward to design policies that 
address an emboldenment effect than policies that curb favoritism. Still, our  findings 
could justify targeted increases in sanctions. They could also lend  support to 
 information campaigns that counterbalance images of ethnic superiority. Of course, 
such policies are unlikely to be implemented by political parties that are organized 
along ethnic lines. Hence, at a more fundamental level, our results can also be 
read as an argument in favor of institutional reforms that make the political system 
more inclusive.
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